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Suspected outbreaks caused by Pseudomonas aeruginosa in 19 hospitals and
two motels were studied. On the basis of epidemiological analysis, serological
typing, and antibiotic resistance patterns, 17 were classified as single-strain
outbreaks. Six were classified as common-source outbreaks: of these, three were
caused by contaminated urological instruments or solutions, two involved bathing
in contaminated whirlpools, and one was caused by contaminated lens prostheses
implanted during eye surgery. The ability of P. aeruginosa to survive or grow in
wet environments was important in each of these six outbreaks. Eight outbreaks
were classified as cross-infection. Two involved the urinary tract and were caused
by antibiotic-resistant strains. Six involved the respiratory tract, but only one was
caused by an antibiotic-resistant strain. In 2 of the 17 single-strain outbreaks, the
exact mode of transmission could not be determined. One was an outbreak of
pseudobacteremia in which patient blood cultures were contaminated with a
single strain, presumably during collection of specimens or culture processing. P.
aeruginosa serogroup 011 caused 9 of 17 (53%) single-strain outbreaks, a
surprising finding since this serogroup represents only about 8% of endemic
hospital isolates of this species. Serotyping was very useful in epidemiological
analysis, but antibiotic susceptibility patterns were less useful.
Pseudomonas aeruginosa accounts for about
11% of all nosocomial infections (4). Although
infections caused by P. aeruginosa occur spo-
radically in all hospitals, many occur in clusters
(18), suggesting cross-infection or common-
source spread. We studied isolates of P. aeru-
ginosa from suspected outbreaks in 21 institu-
tions (7, 9, 10, 23). This report compares
serotyping results and antibiograms, the two
most common markers used for comparing
strains of P. aeruginosa; points out the impor-
tance of serogroup 011 in outbreaks; summa-
rizes some of the epidemiological findings; and
discusses possible control measures.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Microbiology. All isolates of P. aeruginosa were
originally identified by the submitting laboratory. Iso-
lates that did not have the typical characteristics (blue-
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green pigment, fruity odor, characteristic colonial
morphology) were confirmed biochemically at the
Enteric Section, Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
(6, 7). Antimicrobial susceptibility patterns (antibio-
grams) were determined by the single-disk method of
Bauer et al. (3). It is now well accepted that P.
aeruginosa has intrinsic resistance to most antibiotics
and is often susceptible only to colistin, carbenicillin,
gentamicin, tobramycin, and amikacin (22). Since all
of our isolates were susceptible to colistin, only resist-
ance to the latter four drugs is mentioned. (P. aerugin-
osa is also usually susceptible to the third-generation
cephalosporins introduced into the United States after
this study was completed.) A resistant strain was
defined to be one resistant to carbenicillin, gentamicin,
tobramycin, or amikacin. Serotyping was done by
slide agglutination with live antigens taken from the
antibiogram plates and with 17 commercial antisera
against the 0 antigens of P. aeruginosa (6, 7). All of
these methods have been described in greater detail
elsewhere (6, 7, 11, 20).
Outbreaks studied. Unsolicited cultures from possi-
ble outbreaks in 21 institutions in the United States (13
states) were submitted to the Enteric Section, CDC,
for typing. None had been typed by the sender.
Epidemiological information about the outbreak was
supplied by infection control personnel, usually both
an infection control nurse and a physician-epidemiolo-
gist, who did the actual investigation. The final results
of the epidemiological investigation were discussed by
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TABLE 1. Summary of common-source outbreaks
P. aeruginosa
Institution Infection site Common source Serogroup Resistant to':
1. Federal hospital Urinary tract Contaminated resectoscope 04 CB, GM, TB
2. Community hospital Urinary tract Contaminated cystoscope 06 CB, GM, TB
3. University hospital Urinary tract Contaminated irrigation syringe 011 GM
4. Community hospital Eye Contaminated lens prosthesis 06 b
5. Motel Skin Contaminated whirlpool 011
6. Motel Skin Contaminated whirlpool 011
aOnly resistance to carbenicillin (CB), gentamicin (GM), tobramycin (TB), or amikacin is listed.
b The strain was susceptible to all four.
telephone with R.A.W., a physician-epidemiologist
with the Hospital Infections Branch, CDC. Of the 21
outbreaks, 19 occurred in acute-care hospitals, and 2
were in motels and were associated with bathing in
contaminated whirlpools or swimming pools (see Ta-
bles 1 and 2). More detailed information about the
outbreaks in hospital 4 and motels 5 and 6 has already
been published (9, 10, 23).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Summary of outbreaks. Routine surveillance
in the 21 institutions had shown presumed clus-
tering of Pseudomonas infections of the respira-
tory tract (seven outbreaks), urinary tract (six
outbreaks), blood stream (four outbreaks), skin
(two outbreaks), eye (one outbreak), or wounds
(one outbreak). On the basis of epidemiological
investigations and laboratory results, 17 of the
outbreaks were defined as single-strain out-
breaks: six were common-source outbreaks,
eight were cross-infection outbreaks, one was an
outbreak of pseudobacteremia caused by bacte-
rial contamination introduced during specimen
collection or culture processing, and two were
outbreaks for which the exact mode of transmis-
sion could not be determined (caused by P.
aeruginosa serogroups 011 and 06). Four of the
suspect outbreaks were not confirmed to be
actual outbreaks.
Common-source outbreaks. In six of the sin-
gle-strain outbreaks (Table 1), a common source
was implicated epidemiologically and verified by
culture results and serological typing (institu-
tions 3, 4, 5, and 6) or implicated epidemiologi-
cally at a time when adequate cultures of the
sources were no longer available (hospitals 1 and
2). The common-source outbreaks in hospitals 1
through 4 involved 6 to 17 patients, with an
average of 11 patients. In one common-source
outbreak of urinary tract infections (hospital 1),
several secondary cases caused by cross-infec-
tion from a patient infected with the epidemic
strain occurred after the common source had
been eliminated.
The three urinary tract outbreaks (Table 1)
were caused by antibiotic-resistant strains of
three serogroups which had contaminated uro-
logical instruments or solutions used at the hos-
pital. The other three strains, two of serogroup
011 and one of serogroup 06, were not antibiot-
ic resistant and were not originally derived from
a hospital setting (the strain obtained from the
hospital 4 outbreak was introduced before the
lens reached the hospital [10]). This finding is
similar to those for Serratia outbreaks, in which
hospital strains are more resistant to antibiotics
than are strains originating from outside the
hospital (11).
The spread of the common-source infections
was facilitated by gross breaks in asepsis, such
as the failure to disinfect irrigation equipment
(hospital 3), and by the ability of P. aeruginosa
to survive and actually grow in wet environ-
ments (12, 14, 26), including inappropriate disin-
fectants such as dilute aqueous benzalkonium
chloride (hospitals 1 and 2), swimming pool or
whirlpool water (institutions 5 and 6), and bicar-
bonate suspending fluid used in the packaging of
eye lenses (hospital 4). Most common-source
outbreaks caused by P. aeruginosa can be ex-
plained by the ecological adaptation of this orga-
nism to grow in wet environments, even those
low in nutrients such as disinfectants or distilled
water (12).
Cross-infection outbreaks. In eight of the sin-
gle-strain outbreaks, cross-infection was impli-
cated as the predominant mode of spread (Table
2). Five of the eight outbreaks were caused by P.
aeruginosa serogroup 011. Most of the cross-
infection outbreaks involved the respiratory
tract and affected patients who were intubated
or had tracheostomies. These outbreaks oc-
curred when in-use respirator tubing was not
changed regularly or when aseptic respiratory
care technique was not practiced. When these
deficiencies were corrected, epidemic spread of
P. aeruginosa ceased in each outbreak. In one of
the outbreaks involving the respiratory tract
cross-infection, the epidemic strain was intro-
duced into the respiratory-care unit by a newly
admitted patient with chronic lung disease. The
outbreak ended when this patient was removed
from the unit and the intubated patients were
separated from one another.
In two of the eight cross-infection outbreaks
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TABLE 2. Summary of cross-infection outbreaks
P. aeruginosa
Institution Infection site Serogroup Resistant to":
7. University hospital Urinary tract 011 CB, GM, TB
8. Federal hospital Urinary tract 012 CB, GM
9. Municipal hospital Respiratory tract 011 b
10. Community hospital Respiratory tract 06
11. University hospital Respiratory tract 01
12. University hospital Respiratory tract 011
13. Community hospital Respiratory tract 011 GM
14. University hospital Respiratory tract 011
a Only resistance to carbenicillin (CB), gentamicin (GM), tobramycin (TB), or amikacin is listed.
b The strain was susceptible to all four.
(hospitals 8 and 14), infected patients extensive-
ly contaminated ambu bags (rubber bags used
with endotracheal tubes to inflate the lung),
urine testing apparatus, soap, and other items
that came into direct contact with patients or
hospital personnel. Such contamination resulted
in an expanded reservoir for the epidemic strain
and in secondary common-source spread. These
outbreaks lasted longer (4 and 8 months) and
involved more patients (14 and 40) than the other
cross-infection outbreaks, which had an average
duration of 1 month and involved an average of
only six patients.
Outbreak of pseudobacteremia. Hospital 15
had an outbreak of pseudobacteremia caused by
P. aeruginosa serogroup 01. During 1 week,
blood cultures of 17 patients from 7 nursing units
on five floors were positive for P. aeruginosa.
The clinical status and course of 16 of the 17
patients were not compatible with pseudomonas
sepsis. The conclusion of the on-site epidemio-
logical investigation was that the blood cultures
were contaminated with P. aeruginosa sero-
group 01 during collection or processing. The
incriminated strain was not found in a culture
survey of blood collecting and culture process-
ing equipment done after the outbreak ended.
However, other outbreaks of pseudobacteremia
have been traced to contaminated commercial
vacuum tubes used for collecting blood, contam-
inated skin antiseptics, and various processing
errors (25).
Presumed outbreaks that were not outbreaks.
For 4 of the 21 suspect outbreaks, no epidemic
strain was found. One of these four outbreaks
represented an artifact of surveillance. System-
atic review showed that there had been no real
change in the infection rate, only an increased
interest. In two hospitals, an early attempt was
being made to evaluate a potential infection
problem in a critical hospital area. Each hospital
sent isolates from two infected patients who
were in specialty units where pseudomonas in-
fections had been rare and cross-infection or
common-source spread of pseudomonas could
be disastrous (in one hospital, a premature-
infant intensive-care unit; in the other, a leuke-
mia ward). In both instances, the two strains
were of different serogroups and were interpret-
ed as being unrelated. Follow-up in the units
confirmed that there were no additional linked
cases. For these two hospitals, the serotyping
data was of great value since the possibility of
cross-infection or a common-source exposure to
a virulent strain could not have been excluded
on the basis of antibiograms and epidemiological
findings. The fourth cluster consisted of four
patients with urinary tract infections. The physi-
cian-microbiologist at the hospital noted that all
four strains of P. aeruginosa had mucoid colo-
nies, an unusual finding for strains isolated from
urine. No epidemiological relationship among
the infected patients could be demonstrated, and
all four mucoid strains had different 0 antigens.
P. aeruginosa serogroup Oll in outbreaks. In a
previous study (7) of 425 endemic strains from
six hospitals, serogroup O11 accounted for an
average of only 8% of the endemic isolates (14,
11, 10, 9, 6, and 0%). However, in the present
study, this serogroup caused 9 of the 17 single-
strain outbreaks. These were unsolicited cul-
tures from many parts of the United States.
There was no further correlation among any of
the serotypes and infection site, mode of trans-
mission, or location or type of institution.
The role of P. aeruginosa serogroup O11 in
causing skin rashes associated with bathing in
contaminated pools is now well documented (9,
14, 16, 21, 23) and is probably related to the
distribution of this serogroup in pools (14). O11
is also the predominant serogroup associated
with otitis externa in deep-sea divers who stay in
large pressure chambers for several weeks (1).
However, we were surprised to find so many
hospital outbreaks caused by this serogroup. No
information was available on the distribution of
endemic serogroups of P. aeruginosa in any of
the 17 institutions. However, some institutions
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included endemic isolates along with epidemic
isolates, and only 2 of 42 (5%) endemic isolates
were of serogroup 011. These data and the
previously published distribution data suggest
that serogroup O11 strains occur more frequent-
ly in epidemic situations than they do endemical-
ly. This finding may be due to any of a number of
factors that influence the ability of this group to
survive and grow in the hospital environment,
resist disinfection, colonize human tissue, in-
vade, and cause disease. Further investigation is
needed to learn why P. aeruginosa serogroup
O11 causes hospital outbreaks.
Evaluation of serotyping and antibiograms as
markers of pseudomonas outbreaks. Serotyping
is feasible in most clinical microbiology labora-
tories since antisera are available commercially
and the technique can be based on slide aggluti-
nation of living cells. Brokopp and co-workers
(7) found that about 95% of the clinical isolates
from six hospitals (425 strains) were typable.
Almost 90% of these could be typed with only 9
of the 17 sera. Most strains agglutinate in only
one antiserum, and this is a stable property of
the cultures. The one drawback to serotyping is
that isolates of the more common 0 groups may
be different strains (in a genetic or epidemiologi-
cal sense) even though they share the same 0
antigen. Additional methods such as pyocin typ-
ing, bacteriophage susceptibility, and determi-
nation of the H antigen can be used for subdivid-
ing strains of the same 0 group, but none of
these methods is practical for routine use. A set
of typing sera for 0 groups 1 through 12, which
will agglutinate about 90% of hospital strains,
can be kept in a refrigerator almost indefinitely
and can be used in the investigation of an
infection problem. Unlike most species of En-
terobacteriaceae, P. aeruginosa has intrinsic
resistance to many antibiotics (22). Although
resistance to carbenicillin, gentamicin, amika-
cin, or tobramycin can be very helpful in spot-
ting a possible infection problem (2), several
observations indicate that antibiogram compari-
sons of P. aeruginosa should be interpreted
cautiously in epidemiological analysis. First, in
11 of the single-strain outbreaks, the antibio-
gram of the epidemic strain varied, with change
in susceptibility to sulfadiazine or carbenicillin
accounting for most of the variability. Second,
more than 50% of the epidemic and endemic
isolates from 5 of the 11 institutions sending both
types of isolates had the same antibiogram.
Third, although gentamicin resistance in pseudo-
monas is often assumed to be a helpful marker,
for two outbreaks (hospitals 2 and 3) we found
that both epidemic and endemic strains were
gentamicin resistant. Resistance to gentamicin
was variable in the epidemic strain from one
outbreak (hospital 13). These findings are not
surprising since it has been shown that endemic
strains of P. aeruginosa can become resistant to
carbenicillin and the aminoglycosides when
these drugs are used clinically (2, 8, 13, 15).
Only a very resistant antibiogram with high
resistance to both carbenicillin and aminoglyco-
sides proved to be a consistent marker. The
media used in antibiotic susceptibility testing
should be carefully quality controlled to prevent
the introduction of an additional variable. The
results of P. aeruginosa susceptibility to amino-
glycoside antibiotics are known to depend on the
concentration of cations present.
Others have also noted that the antibiotic
resistance pattern of an epidemic strain can
change during an outbreak, particularly an out-
break extended in time or space, and that strains
that are not related epidemiologically can have
the same antibiogram (17). These data indicate
that serotyping can be a useful addition to antibi-
otic susceptibility testing. Moreover, serotyping
of P. aeruginosa can provide valuable surveil-
lance data in selected specialty units housing
high-risk patients and can be useful in the further
differentiation of antibiotic-resistant isolates.
Control measures. Ongoing active surveillance
of hospital-acquired infections is critical for ear-
ly detection of outbreaks. Once an outbreak is
detected, control measures should be quickly
instituted based on prior experience (5, 17, 19)
and thorough, on-site, epidemiological investi-
gation. Control of common-source outbreaks
depends on finding and eliminating the contam-
inated source; however, as we showed, late
cross-infections may result once the epidemic
organism has been introduced into the patient
population.
Pseudomonas cross-infection outbreaks may
be more difficult to control, particularly if a
large reservoir of asymptomatic infection (or of
gastrointestinal or respiratory tract colonization)
has been established or if extensive environmen-
tal contamination has led to secondary common-
source spread. Measures for controlling cross-
infection outbreaks (5, 19, 24) include the
following: identification and appropriate isola-
tion of infected (and at times colonized) patients;
physical separation of high-risk patients, such as
those with endotracheal tubes or urinary cathe-
ters; emphasis on hand washing and aseptic
techniques, including the use of gloves when
manipulating infected sites; and detection and
elimination of any secondary environmental
contamination and common-source spread of
infection.
Although transient hand carriage of gram-
negative bacteria by personnel who have not
washed after patient contact is well recognized
as a critical step in cross-infection outbreaks,
the importance of persistent pseudomonas colo-
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nization of the hospital staff is unknown. In the
outbreaks reported here, serological typing was
helpful in exonerating and returning to work
several hospital workers who were throat or gut
carriers of P. aeruginosa.
ADDENDUM
Since the original planned study was completed and
our report was prepared, C.H.Z. received unsolicited
cultures from seven additional outbreaks (these did
not receive the complete epidemiological follow-up of
the original study). Six of the seven outbreaks were
caused by P. aeruginosa serogroup 011, and the other
involved serogroups 011 and 06. The sources and
suspected mode of transmission, as reported by the
submitting investigators, were as follows (all out-
breaks caused by P. aeruginosa serogroup 011 unless
otherwise indicated): (i) endocarditis in heroin addicts
which was community acquired and caused by con-
taminated syringes, (ii) respiratory tract infections in a
community hospital caused by a contaminated bron-
choscope, (iii) urinary tract infections in a community
hospital caused by contaminated catheters, (iv) skin
rashes at a spa caused by the contaminated water in a
swimming pool, (v) postsurgical wound infections at a
community hospital intensive-care unit (undetermined
mode of transmission), (vi) respiratory tract infections
in a community hospital nursery (undetermined mode
of transmission), and (vii) respiratory tract infections
in a community hospital nursery caused by P. aerugin-
osa serogroups 011 and 06 (undetermined mode of
transmission).
These data strengthen the association of P. aerugin-
osa 011 and outbreaks.
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